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Abstract
Despite the European Parliament’s (EP) growing role, its influence and scrutiny capacity remain considerably weaker than
the role traditionally reserved for parliaments in economic and fiscal policy decision‐making at the national level. The EP
has exploited any opportunity to enhance these powers: In particular, the EP has a record of using crisis and extraordinary
situations to expand its role beyond the formal prerogatives given to the institution. Following this literature, this article
examines the role and influence of the EP on economic and fiscal policy, focusing on the response to the Covid‐19 crisis.
Negotiation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility presents an auspicious area to analyse the strategies implemented by
the EP to influence the outcome and reinforce its position in EU economic governance. The article will look specifically at
the formal and informal mechanisms used by the EP during the crisis to expand its powers. Moreover, it utilises a research
design that combines the content analysis of several official/public documents and statements from key members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) involved in economic policy.
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1. Introduction
The prerogatives and accountability capacities of the
European Parliament (EP) have expanded since the 1990s,
peaking with the Treaty of Lisbon (Woźniakowski et al.,
2021). The EP’s agency is said to have played a role in this
expansion, for instance, in introducing de facto powers in
certain aspects of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
governance and tradepolicy (Meissner& Schoeller, 2019).
Similarly, the EP has also obtained scrutiny capacities over
the Commission (Brandsma, 2016), the Council (Wille,
2016), the European Council (EUCO; Van de Steeg, 2009),
European agencies (Busuioc, 2013), and even over the
Brexit negotiations (Closa, 2020). However, the EP has
also failed in other attempts to extend its powers. Whilst
the Treaty of Lisbon presented the EP as an ‘equal’ to
the Council, the EP found itself sidelined in the design
of the response to the Eurozone crisis (Bressanelli &
Chelotti, 2016, 2018; Fabbrini, 2013; Puetter, 2012). Thus,
the European Stability Mechanism (Rittberger, 2014) or
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (Schoeller &
Héritier, 2019) are examples of resounding failures in the
EP’s attempts to expand its powers.
The Covid‐19 crisis represents a new opportunity for
the EP to expand its powers to a new area. Thus, in
response to the crisis, several new policy instruments
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were created, among which the Recovery and Resilience
Facility (RRF) stands out. The RRF is part of a pack‐
age of funds dedicated to fight the pandemic, the
NextGenerationEU (€750 bn), which includes the RRF
(€672.5 bn), ReactEU (€47.5 bn), InvestEU (€5.6 bn),
Horizon Europe (€5 bn), Rural Development (€7.5 bn),
Just Transition Fund (€10 bn), and RescEU (€1.9 bn).
The unprecedented size of the package, the combination
of grants and loans, and the fact that the issuance of EU
debt finances the instrument make the Facility a major
development. Hence, the RRF negotiations represent an
excellent case study to examine the strategies deployed
by the EP to acquire new powers and its ability to influ‐
ence the outcome.
Building on the literature on the self‐empowerment
of the EP, we investigate whether and why the EP acts as
a maximiser of its own powers. To that end, we address
two questions: (1) To what extent (if any) did the EP
increase its powers or influence during the RRF negoti‐
ations? and (2) Why did the EP fail to acquire all the pow‐
ers and influence it demanded? In doing so, we argue
that the EP implemented a set of strategies in order to
expand its powers and influence during the RRF negoti‐
ations. However, the use of those strategies was condi‐
tioned by a series of external factors that ultimately lim‐
ited the ability of the EP to maximise its powers. In this
context, the EP opted to settle for smaller concessions
than those originally demanded.
To tackle these questions, first, we try to assess
the level of the EP’s success in introducing its policy
agenda and extracting new prerogatives (empowerment
via policy and governance). For this, we rely on the com‐
parison of different legislative documents, complement‐
ing this with interviews with members of the European
Parliament (MEPs). Second, we present empirical evi‐
dence derived from 13 interviews with key decision‐
makers involved in the negotiations and a wide range of
official documents to analyse the strategies used by the
EP in its attempts to expand its powers and the limita‐
tions it faced along the way.
Our findings suggest that the EP obtained limited
gains in terms of accountability and scrutiny capacities in
the RRF, but conversely extracted important policy con‐
cessions. Moreover, we confirm that the EP sought its
own empowerment through the deployment of several
strategies destined to reinforce its bargaining position.
This is in line with previous studies that argue that the
empowerment can be explained through rational institu‐
tionalist mechanisms. Nevertheless, rather than a pure
power maximiser, willing to pursue its empowerment at
all costs, from the negotiations emerges the picture of
a pragmatic negotiator. Thus, the EP used several strate‐
gies to advance its preferences and extract concessions,
whether these refer to policy or governance. However,
when faced with a series of adverse conditions, the EP
preferred to settle for smaller gains rather than embark‐
ing on a costly political confrontation in order to max‐
imise its powers.
The large set of resources under negotiation facili‐
tated the negotiation over policy outcomes, while the
lack of predisposition to yield governance instruments
that the EP perceived in the Council represented an
obstacle for the EP. Moreover, the costs associated with
implementing hard strategies (e.g., delaying the approval
or vetoing the package), the lack of support from the
Commission, and the limits to intergroup consensus con‐
cur to explain the pragmatic approach taken by the EP.
2. The Empowerment of the EP
Since the late 1980s andearly 1990s, the EPhas increased
its powers across several policy areas (Hix & Høyland,
2013). Thus, examples of such empowerment can be
found in trade policy (Meissner, 2016; Ripoll Servent,
2014; Rosén, 2016), Brexit negotiations (Closa, 2020),
political and technocratic appointments (Hix, 2002;
Schoeller & Héritier, 2019) or financial supervision and
economic governance (Fasone, 2014; Rittberger, 2014).
Within this context, the EP has systematically
attempted to maximise its prerogatives and account‐
holding powers (Bressanelli & Chelotti, 2016; Héritier,
2017;O’Keeffe et al., 2016; Rittberger, 2014). Sometimes,
concessions in these areas partially compensate the EP
for its lack of substantial influence in the design of
key legislation (Dionigi, 2020; Dionigi & Koop, 2019).
Additionally, these ad hoc concessions may create an
incrementalist process (Benedetto & Hix, 2007; Hix,
2002), which results in the EP using the new prerogatives
to propose an expansive interpretation of the rules to fur‐
ther extend its powers.
Some scholars explain the empowerment of the EP
by focusing on agency itself (Farrell & Héritier, 2007;
Héritier et al., 2015; Hix, 2002; Meissner & Schoeller,
2019). These authors understand the EP as a rational
power maximiser, which actively seeks to expand its
role through differentmeans and strategies. For instance,
assuming asymmetry of information and imperfect con‐
tract theories, Hix (2002) argues that one way through
which the EP has extended its power is bymoving quickly
to present an expansive interpretation of the existing de
jure rules. This allows the EP to create de facto practices,
which are then accepted by other actors and formalized
as formal rules in subsequent reforms. Prolonging this
line of argument, other authors (Closa, 2020; Schoeller
& Héritier, 2019) also show how the EP uses all the
resources and prerogatives at its disposal in order to
obtain new powers.
As an alternative to this pure rational institutionalist
approach, another set of authors (Goetze & Rittberger,
2010; Pollack, 1997, 1999; Rittberger, 2012, 2014) assign
less weight to the agency component and suggest that
behind the empowerment of the EP there is an ideolog‐
ical commitment to reduce the democratic deficit. Thus,
they emphasise the normative pressure to empower the
EP and argue that the expansion of the role of the EP
also responds to the need to increase the legitimacy of
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the decision‐making process. Hence, the empowerment
can also be promoted by persuasion or driven by pub‐
lic demands.
In line with the rational institutionalist approach, we
argue that the EP behaved as a strategic actor during
the RRF negotiations, seeking to increase its powers and
influence by exploiting all the resources at its disposal
through the use of several strategies. This repertoire
includes veto threats, issue linkage, timing control, inter‐
group consensus, and interinstitutional alliances.
Firstly, threatening to veto outcomes if its demands
are not accepted gives the EP leverage vis‐à‐vis any
other negotiating actor. Therefore, the EP has waived
its veto in areas such as the appointment and investi‐
ture of the Commission (Moury, 2007) or in the ratifi‐
cation of agreements such as the SWIFT interim agree‐
ment (from 2010) and the Anti‐Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (from 2012; Devuyst, 2013; Shaohua, 2015).
Similarly, it has also used this successfully during the
negotiation of the Brexit agreement (Closa, 2020).
Secondly, the EP has also used issue linkage strate‐
gies repeatedly, seeking to connect areas where the insti‐
tution has more powers with others where it counts on
less (formal) powers (Héritier, 2017; Schoeller & Héritier,
2019). Since the bargaining position of the EP is stronger
when co‐decision or consent are required (O’Keeffe et al.,
2016), the EP may seek to link issues where these proce‐
dures apply with others not covered by them. Examples
of this can be found in budget negotiations (Alfé, 2007)
and economic governance (Héritier et al., 2015).
Thirdly, the EP can also use to its advantage the tim‐
ing and urgency of a decision to improve its negotiating
position. Thus, the EP can seek to delay a decision to
gain leverage or speed it up in attempt to set the agenda.
Héritier et al. (2019) present several examples where the
EP recurred to a delaying strategy. However, timing can
also play against the EP. During the Eurozone crisis, the
need for a prompt response to calm the financialmarkets
and avoid negative effects favoured intergovernmental
or technocratic bodies and relegated the EP (Bressanelli
& Chelotti, 2016).
Fourthly, the EP can more easily obtain concessions
from other institutions when the main political groups
agree on a certain position and show unity in their action
(Closa, 2020; Costello & Thomson, 2013; Kreppel, 1999;
O’Keeffe et al., 2016). Intergroup consensus tends to be
used as a complementary strategy and as a way of rein‐
forcing the bargaining position. Thus, it can be a power
instrument to reinforce the credibility of a veto threat,
display force, or facilitate the use of an expansionary
interpretation of the rules (issue linkage).
Finally, the EP may also seek to establish alliances
with European institutions, typically the European
Commission (Closa, 2020; Rosén, 2016), to reach cer‐
tain policy goals. These institutions are likely to coop‐
erate to increase their power and influence based
on a common interest and a shared integrationist or
pro‐European identity.
This repertoire follows the list of strategies from
Héritier et al. (2019) to obtain formal and informal
institutional changes. Nonetheless, the repertoire above
does not exhaust all possible strategies, leaving out well‐
known ones such as the threat of the European Court of
Justice, unilateral first moves, the use of external pres‐
sure, etc. Instead, we have sought to narrow the list
to those relevant to our case (a comprehensive list in
Héritier et al., 2019). Similarly, it should also be men‐
tioned that the EP rarely uses any of the strategies in
isolation but rather combines them. Thus, several exam‐
ples display a combination of strategies with different
degrees of success, e.g., interinstitutional alliances with
veto threats (Closa, 2020) or delaying strategies and issue
linkage (Schoeller & Héritier, 2019).
Drawing on this theoretical framework, we argue
that the EP sought to increase its powers in the RRF
negotiations through the deployment of several bar‐
gaining strategies. Nevertheless, these strategies faced
a series of limitations that led the EP to settle for
smaller gains instead of recurring to harder (and more
costly) strategies.
3. Methodology and Data
The outcome to be explained is the empowerment of the
EP in the case of the RRF (i.e., concessions and changes
made in the text to include the priorities of the EP con‐
cerning governance). Additionally, we also present con‐
cessions to EP demands concerning policy. Capturing the
influence of the EP in the negotiations is a very difficult
task, leading scholars to tackle this challenge through dif‐
ferent approaches and operationalisations. For instance,
Meissner and Schoeller (2019) designed an index of
empowerment for the EP, based on four types of empow‐
erments and using evidence extracted from legislative
texts and interviews.
Several factors explain the difficulty to assess the
empowerment of the EP in the case of the RRF. First,
the large number of exchanges held at each stage of the
process makes it hard to identify where an idea is com‐
ing from and capture agenda‐setting effects (e.g., the
Commission knowing it needs to secure the support of
the EP and that the Council is likely to incorporate their
preferences and proposal in the first draft). Second, sev‐
eral documents and reports are negotiated in different
fora (i.e., between political groups, committees, plenary),
making it more difficult to keep track of changes. Third,
in parallel to the changes promoted by the EP, decisions
taken by other actors during the process may be incor‐
porated into the documents prepared by the EP. Hence,
changes need to be disentangled. Finally, when exam‐
ining legislative documents, it is necessary to take into
account their connection with other pieces of legislation
and that some amendments may be included only to
obtain concessions in other areas.
In light of these challenges, we use a crude but com‐
prehensive approach to assess the empowerment and
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influence of the EP. On the one hand, we compare the
Commission proposal (European Commission, 2020), the
draft resolution of the EP (maximum position; EP, 2020),
and the final text (outcome) agreed on with the Council
(Regulation of the EP and of the Council of 12 February
2021, 2021). On the other, we complement this initial
assessment with the main changes observed in other
legislation connected with the RRF, the Own Resources
Decision (ORD; Council Decision of 14 December 2020,
2020), the Multinational Financial Framework (MFF) reg‐
ulation (Council Regulation of 17 December 2020, 2020),
and the conditionality on the rule of law regulation
(Regulation of the EP and the Council of 16 December
2020, 2020). Finally, given that comparison of the text
can be misleading, as some amendments may be intro‐
duced for opportunistic reasons and might be consid‐
ered unlikely to pass by the proponents themselves, we
refine the assessment with the evidence extracted from
the interviews.
We define empowerment as the expansion of the
formal prerogatives of the EP and the increase in
the influence of the EP over the policy implemented.
Consequently, we focus on the empowerment observed
in two areas: governance and policy. By governance,
we understand this as the institutional mechanisms and
procedures that allow the EP to participate in the RRF
and hold other institutions accountable. Meanwhile, by
policy, we understand this as the ability of the EP to
shape or alter the goals, funds, and priorities of the RRF.
Finally, we treat the EP as a unit given that as an institu‐
tion it passes legislation, issues official statements, and
engages in negotiations with other actors based on the
common position set by the groups.
Evidence for explaining why and how empower‐
ment happened comes from two sources. On the one
hand, we have conducted 13 interviews with MEPs and
Commission officers (see the list of interviews in the
Supplementary File II). We transcribed and coded the
interviews (see codebook in the Supplementary File III).
To verify that the EP has used any of the strategies, evi‐
dence (interviewees and documentary sources) should
be consistent and back the use of each strategy. We set
as a test that at least two interviewees utter statements
that interpretatively contain references to these strate‐
gies. In line with best practices for transparency in qual‐
itative research (Closa, 2021), we include a detailed
research implementation report (Supplementary File I)
plus the list of interviewees (Supplementary File II), the
Codebook (Supplementary File III), and the output of the
Atlas.ti@ analysis (Supplementary File IV). Given word
count limitations, we report in Supplementary File VII
all quotations used to substantiate interpretation in the
findings section. In the text, the number in brackets
redresses towards the same number in Supplementary
File VII.
On the other hand, we compiled 63 press releases
issued by the EP (included in the Supplementary File)
regarding negotiations of the MFF–RRF throughout the
year 2020 (up until November 30). Additionally, we sup‐
plement these documents with parliamentary resolu‐
tions concerning the MFF–RRF (approved between 2018
and 2020) and with statements from key MEPs involved
in the negotiations, which are included in press docu‐
ments or open letters. Given that the EP opted for car‐
rying out a very public negotiation, communicating its
demands in several public documents, these documents
constitute a reliable source to identify the position of
the EP, the arguments it uses, and the strategies it imple‐
ments (see Supplementary File VI). Moreover, they allow
us to observe how the negotiations evolved over time.
4. Findings
4.1. The Influence of the EP on the Negotiations
Table 1 shows the main powers and policy concessions
obtained by the EP in the negotiations of the RRF reg‐
ulation. In terms of governance, the provisions focus
mainly on guaranteeing access to information, the estab‐
lishment of mechanisms enhancing accountability and
scrutiny capacities of the EP, and the creation of proce‐
dures that facilitate assessment of the implementation.
In terms of policy, the EP was able to influence spending
priorities significantly, shape the policy agenda behind
the RRF, and define the criteria for assessment of the
recovery plans. The reinforcement of the EP’s role refers
not only to the outcome but also to the negotiating pro‐
cess itself: initially, the legal basis and, hence, the pro‐
cedure for creating the new recovery instrument was
unclear. Options included Article 122 TFEU or Article 352
TFEU, and there were questions on its compatibility with
Articles 310 and 311. In the end, the European Recovery
Instrument (the funds behind the RRF) was established
via Article 122, which does not reserve any role for the EP.
Therefore, being part of the negotiating table from the
beginning was already a victory for the EP, which could
have been excluded from the process (or, at least, it was
not clear that its inclusion was inevitable).
Whilst the concessions obtained improved the role
assigned to the EP in the initial proposal, they fell short
of its most ambitious aspirations. In its public assess‐
ment, the EP valued in particular the establishment
of a new procedure (the dialogue) “in order to agree
on the budgetary implications of any proposed new
legal act on the basis of Article 122” (EP press release
November 10). Most MEPs and Commission officials
share this positive evaluation of the governance outcome
(1 in Supplementary File VII), whilst others do not concur
(2). Additionally, some of them reconcile both positive
and negative judgements (3) and recognize that some of
the amendments regarding the role of the EP were unre‐
alistic (4). Finally, it should also be noted that up to seven
MEPs argued that the real discussion on the role of the
EP in the governance of the RRF is yet to come (5).
Institutions treated RFF negotiations in connection
with other budgetary issues, such as the ORD, the MFF
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Table 1. Powers and policy concessions obtained by the EP in the RRF regulation.
Concessions Not Obtained by the EP or




Broad access to information and on
equal conditions as the Council.
Right to be informed and to invite the
EC to discuss the suspension of the
funds on the basis of sound economic
governance.
Access to the information on the main





The EC shall present a review report
on the implementation by July 2022.
EP may invite the EC to discuss it.
EC must present preliminary
assessment on progress towards the
milestones in the RRPs and the EP may
invite it to obtain more information.
Establishment of the Recovery and
Resilience Dialogue. Entitles the EP to
invite the EC every two months to get
information.
EP may issue resolutions in the
framework of the recovery dialogue
and the EC shall take them into
account.
EC must present an annual report on
targets and disbursements.
Shorter deadlines for the independent
evaluation report on the
implementation and the ex‐post
evaluation.
Delegated powers given to the EC
significantly restricted.
EC must review the application of the
mechanism in 2024 or if there is a
major change.
The Recovery and Resilience Dialogue
does not cover representatives of
member states, the Council and its
bodies, or the Eurogroup.
Quarterly reports from member states
within the European Semester process
in which EP may invite member states
to discuss progress on RRPs.
Biannual reports on implementation,
targets and disbursements. These
reports also need to include
repayment details.
Biannual reports from independent
fiscal institutions and their assessment
of the costs.
Biannual report on implementation
was limited to one.
EC needs to appear before EP after
negative assessment of RRPs or after
negative assessment of
its amendment.
Ability to monitor EC’s spending
decisions and the creation of a
database with quarterly information.
Procedural
mechanisms
Establishment of a scorecard to assess
the progress of the RRPs. Results will
be public.
EP may appointment some of the
experts assisting the EC in assessment
of the advances or preparation
of reports.
Two reviews of the regulation (in 2022
and 2026).
Independent fiscal institutions must
validate total costs of the plans.
Connection of some procedures or the
use of some resources with programs
covered by MFF/TFEU procedures.
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Table 1. (Cont.) Powers and policy concessions obtained by the EP in the RRF regulation.
Concessions Not Obtained by the EP or
Area Power Concessions Obtained by the EP Watered Down
Policy Spending
priorities
Allocation of 37% of the funds to the
green agenda (it asked for 40%) and
20% to the digital transformation.
More detailed plans, address county
specific recommendations (CSRs), etc.
Investment of, at least, 7% in each of
the six pillars.
Funds RRF should not substitute national
budgetary expenditure and should
apply principle of no harm.
Pre‐financing of up to 13% (EP asked
for 20%) and eligibility of measures
implemented during 2020 that comply
with rules.
MS may allocate up to 4% (EP asked
for 5%) of RRF to technical support
instrument and InvestEU (MFF).
Complementarity of investments with
funds from international financial
institutions.




Social, sustainable development and
green agenda were reinforced.
Procedures to avoid fraud, corruption,
and conflicts of interest are
incorporated.
More specificity regarding assessment
criteria and on actions of the EC.
Gender equality references were
watered down. Other priorities, too
(but less).
Procedures to ensure compliance with
state aid.
After Stability and Growth Pact’s break
clause ends, EC must propose a
regulation to link RRF with sound
economic governance.
regulation, and the conditionality (rule of law) regulation.
Therefore, to present an accurate account of the empow‐
erment of the EP we also need to look at the outcome of
these negotiations.
In the case of the ORD, the creation of new resources
to ensure that repayment of the RRF does not affect
the regular budget of the Union was a top priority for
the EP. The EP repeatedly identified it as a condition
to give its consent to the whole package (6). Hence,
the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020
(2020) includes a binding roadmap for the introduction
of several new own resources.
Regarding the MFF, the EP pushed to maintain the
level of commitments (to avoid that the RRF had a nega‐
tive impact on thebudget) and to direct funds into certain
policy areas (‘horizontal issues’). Interviewees coincided
that the EP obtained an additional €16 bn to be allocated
to a series of flagship programs selected by the EP (7).
Several of them also pointed out the EP’s success in this
regard (8). This concession was very important for two
reasons. First, it compensated the EP for cuts in certain
areas and allowed the EP to reinforce some of its policy
priorities. Secondly, the EPmanaged (for the first time) to
re‐open the allocation ofMFF funds and acquired a larger
role in the negotiation over distribution of the funds (9).
Thus, even if the concessionwas small in terms of the size,
the EP perceived it as an important victory.
Finally, on the conditionality on the rule of law, the EP
presented amendments to incorporate this issue in the
RRF regulation. In the end, these amendments were not
included in the final text, but were largely accepted and
incorporated in the Regulation 2020/2092 on a General
Regime of Conditionality for the Protection of the Union
budget, whose scope includes the recovery funds. Hence,
although the EP agreed with the Council on softer lan‐
guage, the EP managed to obtain another policy conces‐
sion here.
In summary, the overall balance suggests that the
EP obtained a wide range of concessions. Thus, although
its role in governance of the facility remains limited, the
EP managed to expand this, gaining access to informa‐
tion and reinforcing its accountability and scrutiny capaci‐
ties. More importantly, the EP also exercised a noticeable
influence on the policy side, extracting several conces‐
sions regarding the funds (amounts and allocations) and
shaping the policy priorities that will be pursued through
the RRF. Nonetheless, the EP failed to obtain many of its
demands. To understand this mixed outcome, the next
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section examines bywhichmechanisms the EP attempted
to expand its powers and the limitations it faced.
4.2. The Scope and Limits of the EP’s Strategies: The EP
as a Pragmatic Negotiator
In this section, we verify whether the EP pursued its
empowerment in a way that was consistent with the
rational institutionalist approach. We can confirm that
the EP used several strategies in order to strengthen
its bargaining position and influence the outcome of
the MFF–RRF negotiations. Nonetheless, when faced
with a series of constraints and limitations, the EP dis‐
carded nuclear options and opted for pragmatism, set‐
tling for the smaller concessions identified in the previ‐
ous section.
4.2.1. The Strategic Repertoire of the EP in Action
Based on the repertoire of strategies identified in the
theoretical discussion, we present compelling evidence
that supports the argument that the EP deployed several
strategies to reinforce its bargaining position. Thus, dur‐
ing the negotiations, the EP systematically attempted to
increase its powers and promote its policy agenda using
all the means at its disposal. Such behaviour is in line
with the rational institutionalist argument, although, as
we will see later on, the EP did not act as a pure power
maximiser. In this section, we analyse the use made of
each one of the strategies previously identified, examin‐
ing their potential influence and limits.
4.2.1.1. Issue Linkage and the Strategic Exploitation
of Timing
Evidence shows that issue linkage has been a crucial strat‐
egy for the EP. The RFF was negotiated in parallel to the
ORD, the MFF regulation, and the conditionality (rule of
law) regulation. Each of these instruments provided for
different EP procedural involvement (as Table 2 summa‐
rizes) and created a multidimensional negotiating space
combining timing and procedures.
Although the RRF ended up being approved via
the ordinary legislative procedure, this procedure was
not clear at the beginning of the crisis. The Recovery
Instrumentwas initially based onArticle 122 TFEU,which
does not reserve any role for the EP. However, the
funds of the Recovery Instrument were ultimately con‐
nected with both the ORD (authorization and repayment
provisions) and the MFF (the funds borrowed by the
Commission will be channelled through funds and pro‐
grams covered by certain budgetary procedures). Thus,
the EP acted to link the different parts of the pack‐
age under negotiation. In that spirit, the negotiating
team highlighted that consent for the MFF would only
be granted if they were satisfied with the overall pack‐
age (10). Hence, the EP only gained an effective role and
status as a co‐legislator in the RRF Regulation because
it successfully linked the ORD with the MFF, opening up
space for use of Article 175 TFEU.
Interviews coincide in pointing out the importance
of the fact that negotiations of the four issues were con‐
nected (11). Coordination among the negotiation teams
was strong (12). Issue linkage permitted extending the
effects of procedures to different areas or to gain lever‐
age in other negotiations (13). Thus, the veto implied
in the EP’s consent (MFF) and the delaying power of
consultation (ORD) could be extended to the other acts
connected with the recovery instrument (14). Moreover,
once the EP gained the ability to amend the RRF, it could
also negotiate concessions in other pieces of legislation
in which it was not a co‐legislator. The EP explicitly sanc‐
tioned this arena‐linking strategy connecting the MFF
negotiation with the RRF and the rule of law mechanism
in several EP resolutions and press releases (15).
The temporal and substantive overlap of dossiers
favoured issue linkage and created a specific time frame‐
work that the EP exploited in order to strengthen its
own position. However, timing played a role in two dif‐
ferent directions. At the start of the negotiations, the
EP reached a position much faster than the Council
did and also updated it faster after the Commission
presented its proposals. Thus, it passed a negotiating
mandate in November 2018 (16) and reconfirmed it
in October 2019 (17). Similarly, the EP also reacted
quickly in response to the Covid‐19 crisis, issuing resolu‐
tions in April (18) and May 2020 (19) and an additional
one in reaction to the EUCO conclusions in July (20).
Consequently, it offered to begin the trilateral discus‐
sions as soon as possible to be involved in the process
from an early stage (21).
However, the possibility of strategically exploiting
timing depended also on the Council. The Council took
a considerable amount of time to reach a position on
own resources, evidencing the difficulty of reaching a
compromise among the member states. Nonetheless,
once the national governments agreed, the urgency of
the situation made time a factor working against the EP.
MEPs point out the emergency situation created by
Covid‐19 (22) as well as the costs in public opinion
Table 2. EP’s procedural role.
Instrument Legal basis EP role in decision‐making Date of agreement
Own Resources 311 Opinion (special legislative procedure) EP approval 16 September 2020
MFF 312 Consent (special legislative procedure) 10 November 2020
Rule of Law conditionality 322(1) Ordinary legislative procedure 17 December 2020
RRF 175 Ordinary legislative procedure 18 December 2020
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of delaying the money (23) as key factors of urgency.
Unsurprisingly, the EP agreed to fast track the required
opinion to complete the legislative process and did not
attempt to delay the project. Such a swift response put
the ball back in the Council’s court (24).
The EP and Council agreed on the MFF on November
10. Evidence does not show that the EP sought to
delay approval of the MFF, but whilst the Council was
in a hurry to approve it, the EP was not. In the case
of no agreement, the previous MFF (2014–2020) with
a higher expenditure ceiling would be automatically
extended, reducing the cost of non‐cooperation for the
Parliament (25). Thus, the EP called for activation of a
contingency plan in the event of an automatic extension
of the past MFF ceilings, recalling that this was an option
contemplated in the treaties. The EP repeated its threat
(7th trilogue, October 8), warning that it would walk out
of the negotiations over the lack of advances regarding
the MFF and the funding for 15 flagship programmes if
the Council did not move (26).
Early agreement on theMFFmeant that the EP could
not use the leverage deriving from the MFF over the
other pending issue, i.e., the RRF (27). Hence, once again,
timing became a factor working against the EP (28), with
the Council arguing that a swift approval of the RRF was
necessary and that the EP should not block it (29). During
the trilateral talks, the Council wanted the EP to accept
the deal as it was and pressured for a quick agreement.
However, the Hungarian government blocked the agree‐
ment over the conditionality of the rule of law, which
meant that the Council could not close its negotiations
on this regulation. This cancelled the timing advantage
of the Council (30) and left more room for the EP, who
could present several offers during the subsequent nego‐
tiations (31). In summary, evidence does not show the EP
used a delaying strategy but, rather, that urgency consid‐
erations on the necessity of the RRF weighed heavily in
the calculus of EP actors.
4.2.1.2. The Veto Threat Strategy
Documentary evidence shows that invoking the veto
threat played a salient role in the EP’s strategy. In fact,
the EP used the threat from the very beginning of the
MFF process: Its first resolutions in March 2018 already
warned about it. Hence, leveraging its ability to veto part
of the package was always part of the EP strategy rather
than the result of a failed attempt at persuasion. Some
form of veto threat appears in 22 (34.92%) of the press
releases issued during the negotiations. Moreover, sev‐
eral resolutions and parliamentary documents reflected
this idea.
Interviewees confirmed that the MFF veto was part
of its negotiating repertoire (32). Even though they coin‐
cide in that the EP was more prepared to veto the MFF
and rule of law conditionality regulations and less so the
RFF (33). The ability to veto the MFF was used not only
to try to advance on policy priorities, but also to acquire
a larger role in allocation of the funds in the MFF, going
beyond the formally accorded role (34). The broad inter‐
group consensus, explained below, reinforced the credi‐
bility of the veto threat.
However, interviews consistently mention a factor
that weighed against using the veto and blocking the
negotiations: the costs of failing to reach an agreement
soon. These costs, which were related to the reaction
from public opinion and to a sense of urgency for the
arrival of the money, decreased the willingness of the EP
to effectively veto the RRF (35).
4.2.1.3. Intergroup Consensus
The evidence examined shows significant coordination
among the EP’s political groups. Thus, five of the main
political groups (EPP, S&D, Renew, Greens, andGUE/NGL)
united and held a common bargaining position at the
beginning of the negotiations (reflected in joint let‐
ters, press releases, resolutions, etc.), althoughGUE/NGL
ended up abandoning the common front (36). Moreover,
the votes on the EP resolutions confirm the existence
of a clear parliamentary majority, gaining the support
of 60–70% of the MEPs. In fact, one interviewee consid‐
ered the majority obtained in Committee on Economic
andMonetary Affairs (ECON) and Committee on Budgets
(BUDG) unprecedented (37). Finally, these groups explic‐
itly declared their commitment to veto the agree‐
ment if it was necessary (letter sent by the presidents
of five EP political groups―EPP, S&D, Renew, Greens,
and GUE/NGL―to the EUCO), conditioning approval
of the package on the incorporation of some of the
EP’s priorities.
The presidents of the five largest groups as well as
the interviewees perceived the broad consensus as a
strong negotiating element (38). Additionally, intervie‐
wees acknowledged the existence of a broad consensus
as a necessary tool to negotiate with the Council (39).
Interviewees indicate that the intergroup consensus was
reinforced with the inclusion of the Greens (40). In the
early stages of negotiations (i.e., March 2020), this
group was not aligned with the three main groups (41).
One interviewee reports that the appointment of a new
rapporteur played a major role in the inclusion of the
Greens to the united front (42). Additionally, the Greens
perceived that intra‐group differences in the EPP and
Renew could prevent a sufficient majority (43), which
rendered support from the Greens even more impor‐
tant. This assessment was also shared by an intervie‐
wee from the S&D (44). Moreover, two interviewees
from the Greens believed that bringing the group to the
table increased the green credentials of the whole pack‐
age (45). As for other groups, ECR tried to adhere but did
not find compromise points (46), whilst an interviewee
from ID reports his exclusion from the negotiations and
a lack of access to information (47).
According to interviewees, consensus was forged
by incorporating topics in the package relevant to the
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different groups (48), while excluding those that could
be too divisive (49). Interviewees described the nego‐
tiations to establish a common position as very diffi‐
cult, involving concessions that provoked intra‐group ten‐
sions (50). Interviewees also highlighted the differences
in policy priorities (51), and one of the interviewees
explained very clearly that achieving consensus at the
committee stage was crucial because it preserved the
substantive interests of the different groups (52). For this,
interviewees argued that personal relations among rap‐
porteurs played a very important role and were facili‐
tated bymaintaining the prior negotiating team from the
Reform and Support Programme in the previous legisla‐
ture (53). SomeMEPs suggested that having rapporteurs
from member states set to profit more from the facility
helped consensus (54). Finally, interviewees agreed that
governance of the new RRF was one of the points of con‐
sensus among groups (55).
However, interviewees also mention the links with
national governments as a limit to intergroup consensus.
Interviewees perceived that national needs played a sig‐
nificant part in the calculation of the agreement among
parties (56). Similarly, being in the opposition also played
a role in the behaviour of some parties (57). Moreover,
according to the interviewees, these limits on consensus
also applied to governance mechanisms, particularly to
scrutiny of the national recovery plans (58).
4.2.1.4. Commission–EP Alliance
Despite precedents and a few references included in the
press statements to support the Commission or express
common interests (59), interviewees coincide in say‐
ing that the Commission was not an ally in this spe‐
cific negotiation. Rather, they perceived the Commission
as following the Council’s interests (60), particularly on
issues related to governance. However, interviewees
reported that the Commission was supportive of the
EP’s position on certain policy issues, e.g., climate (61).
One MEP noted that the relationship also depended on
who the Commission’s negotiator was (62). According
to the interviews, lack of support on governance mech‐
anisms happened because the Commission wanted to
preserve its autonomy in implementing measures within
the RRF (63).
4.2.2. The Limits to Power Maximisation and the EP’s
Pragmatism: If You Do Not Get Governance,
Take the Money
As we discussed in the previous section, the strategies of
the EP faced a series of conditions that limited their influ‐
ence, which partially explain why the EP failed to obtain
further concessions. However, a piece of the puzzle is still
missing. Why did the EP opt for settling for smaller gains
instead of trying to use tougher strategies in an attempt
to maximise its powers? Why did the EP opt for pragma‐
tism instead of maximisation?
Interviewees explain the EP’s renouncement of seek‐
ing additional account‐holding powers by combining sev‐
eral aspects. Firstly, the facility itself was an old EP aspira‐
tion and, hence, having it and participating in its design
already signified a success (64). Moreover, other parts
of the budgetary package (i.e., the MFF and rule of law
regulation) emerged as a priority, especially increasing
the size of available funds (65). Moreover, several MEPs
pointed out the EP’s success in this regard (66). Given
that these demands were partially satisfied, the EP had
fewer incentives to block the RRF or any of the other
pieces of the package under negotiation.
Secondly, interviewees agree that the most influen‐
tial governance mechanism, i.e., the possibility of the
EP voting on national recovery plans via voting on del‐
egated acts, was unachievable (67) and three of them
concede that it was overambitious (68). Moreover, inter‐
viewees state that they perceived the Council’s position
on this issue as unmovable and that this marked the
limit to what the EP could achieve (69). Several intervie‐
wees attribute this inflexibility to the sensitive nature of
the Council’s July agreement (70). One interviewee put
it more bluntly, mentioning the asymmetry of powers
between the Council and the EP (71). Additionally, inter‐
viewees also assign an important role to the German
presidency in keeping an inflexible position (72).
Against this unified front on the Council, the EP con‐
sensus was more limited on this issue. Thus, several
interviewees report that, in fact, they were not totally
convinced as to the wisdom of fully involving the EP
in the main instrument of RRF governance, i.e., scru‐
tinizing each national recovery plan. The former state‐
ment is fully subscribed by the S&D interviewee (73).
Nonetheless, second‐preferred solutions still gave the EP
a preeminent role in governance terms (74).
The EP still had tools to seek a more ambitious deal,
even when timing was working against it. Thus, ulti‐
mately it could have opted for tougher strategies, such
as vetoing or delaying the approval of part of the pack‐
age. However, in the context previously described, par‐
ticularly when internal divisions started to arise, these
threats were less credible and less feasible. Moreover,
the actual use of these strategies (assuming the EP was
willing and capable of implementing them) posed two
additional problems. Firstly, MEPs perceived the politi‐
cal, reputational, and economic costs of such moves as
too high. Thus, interviewees recognised that they were
reluctant to implement these strategies given the need
to respond to the emergency and out of concerns regard‐
ing the perception of public opinion (75). Secondly,MEPs
were unconvinced that the use of tougher strategies
would guarantee a better outcome. Instead, they could
endanger the implementation or success of the facility,
an old aspiration of the EP (76).
Moreover, taking the appearance of mentions in EP
press statements as a proxy of the salience given to the
issue, governance was not the main demand of the EP
(being outnumbered by policy concerns, rule of law, size
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of the MFF, or own resources). Additionally, seven inter‐
viewees argue that the RRF regulation was not really the
end of the negotiation. Instead, they believe that the real
battle for governance is yet to come and that they will be
able to expand the role of the EP (77). Such a perception
also contributes to explaining why the EP was not willing
to embark on a costly political battle over an issue that
could be discussed later on.
Given the lack of receptiveness on the governance
side, EP negotiators looked for alternative concessions
within the design of the RRF (78). Interviewees report
that on the policy side, the heterogeneity of prefer‐
ences among governments gave them the opportunity to
exploit divisions in the Council (79). Hence, interviewees
believe that the outcomeof the negotiations includes sig‐
nificant policy gains for the EP (80).
All this seems to point to the notion that the EP could
have pressed for further gains on governance, but it was
uncertain about its ability to extract a more favourable
outcome and was not willing to pay the costs of using
tough strategies. Therefore, rather than attempting to
maximise its powers, it opted for pragmatism, extracting
as many concessions as it could in other areas and set‐
tling for smaller gains on governance.
5. Conclusion
The RRF negotiations are among the most difficult the
EP has faced, due to the number of interconnected
issues and the amount of funds under discussion. The EP
obtained important policy concessions regarding the RRF
(i.e., spending priorities), but failed to obtain amajor role
in its governance. Thus, its accountability and scrutiny
powers over the recovery funds are limited. Nonetheless,
the EP did obtain an important concession in terms of
governance when the EU institutions agreed to give the
EP a seat at the table. Thus, the Parliament’s involve‐
ment in the design of the RRF and the procedure used
to approve it was not guaranteed in the beginning.
We have also provided compelling evidence that the
EP acted as a rational actor during these negotiations,
implementing several strategies in an attempt to rein‐
force its bargaining position and increase its influence.
Thus, the empowerment of the EP (as limited as it may
be judged) was the result of a rational negotiator that
systematically pursued its own empowerment.
Nonetheless, we have also found that the EP
renounced using tougher strategies in an attempt tomax‐
imise its powers, settling for smaller gains. Thus, some
conditions favoured the EP’s pursuit of a more ambitious
outcome. The coincidence of a package of four inter‐
linked dossiers (MFF, own resources, rule of law condi‐
tionality, and RRF) led quite naturally to issue linkage that
allowed the EP to transfer its procedural powers among
them. Additionally, the EP could feint with a veto and
the existence of a large supporting parliamentary major‐
ity, and its high level of intergroup consensus reinforced
the credibility of a veto. Moreover, the structure of the
events and the existing institutional arrangements also
seemed to benefit the EP. For instance, on November 5,
the Council and the EP struck a deal and the former
accepted―although vaguely ―some of the most contro‐
versial points, such as the rule of law mechanism.
However, timing conditioned the ability of the EP
to force an outcome favourable to its best governance
option on the RRF. Having closed the MFF and own
resources dossiers first, the EP risked taking on huge pub‐
lic opinion costs by appearing to be the institution veto‐
ing the arrival of much needed funds if it pushed its gov‐
ernance demands for theRRF. Thus, the opposition of the
Council, the lack of support from the Commission, and
someunderlying cracks in the unity of negotiators regard‐
ing the governance (i.e., the EP’s control on the national
recovery plans) concur to explainwhy the EPdid not push
for its main governance demand. In the face of all these
constraints, the EP decided to settle for smaller gains (of
all kinds) in order to avoid a high‐cost political fight and
acted as a pragmatic negotiator.
However, the story may not be over, as several MEPs
have reported that the fight over governance is yet to
come. The EP has a long history of using newly acquired
prerogatives (as limited as they may seem) to further
extend them and expand its role. With that in mind, the
contribution of our article is threefold. First, it adds evi‐
dence to the debate about the self‐empowerment of
the EP (Farrell & Héritier, 2007; Héritier et al., 2015;
Hix, 2002). Second, it offers a more nuanced version of
the rational institutionalist argument. Thus, our findings
show that the EP acted as a rational actor during the
MFF–RRF negotiations, but one that ultimately emerges
as a pragmatic negotiator rather than as a pure power
maximiser. Finally, it provides original data (including
13 interviews with key decision‐makers involved in the
negotiations) on a very recent and very relevant policy
development, opening venues for further research.
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